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Notice: This forecast is constructed to support the Republic of Perilo as a virtual micronation for training and doctrine development for emergency and disaster managers. Contents of the forecast are intended to portray possible conditions, and are consistent with a variety of sources. However, this is not intended to represent actual or forecast conditions for any physical nation. |
REPUBLIC OF PERILO
NATURAL DISASTER FORECAST 2028 CE
Ministry of Extreme Situations Technical Memorandum 2008-1
PURPOSE
(1) This forecast provides natural disaster scenarios as the basis for resource programming by the Ministry of Extreme Situations, and other national, provincial, and local agencies, to meet likely threats in the year 2028 CE. The forecast is prepared in response to direction by the Minister of Extreme Situations to develop planning documents that allow a longer view of potential hazards and threats than is provided by the annual Hazard Assessment (Republic of Perilo 2007).
DISASTER HISTORY
(2) Records of disasters prior to the arrival of Europeans in Perilo exist only in the oral traditions of the indigenous populations of the Coastal Plain and the Valley of Smoke (Temporosko 1999). Because the early civilizations of Perilo left no written records that have been discovered to date it is difficult to establish the date, extent, and impact of prehistoric disaster events. However, it does appear that at least three major events shaped the destiny of the dominant civilizations at the time of their occurrence (see Table 1 below).
Table 1. Major Prehistoric Disaster Events
|
Approximate Date |
Event |
Impact |
|
220-180 BCE |
Drought |
An extended drought covering the Piedmont and Coastal regions, combined with population pressures and inefficient agricultural methods, is believed to have led to civil war and the collapse of the Tectec Civilization. |
|
1200 CE |
Volcanic Eruption |
A major volcanic eruption and the subsidence of the Smoke Valley Caldera initiated a period of approximately 500 years of volcanic activity and may have contributed to the disappearance of the organized Smoke Valley civilization. |
|
1400 CE |
Tsunami |
Severe and widespread damage along the coastal plain with the destruction of many of the towns of the Ossippee Empire (including even those on coastal mounds) – believed to have started the eventual decline of the Empire. |
Sources: Smitts 1995; Gootschalk 2001; Mbeseki 2005.
(3) Records of disaster events during the Colonial period are limited. Responsibility for disaster response was diffuse, with no single colonial government agency having primary responsibility, and many of the records that may have been kept were destroyed during the Independence Day earthquake. However, the events listed in Table 2 provide a sense of the types of events that occurred.
Table 2. Colonial Period Disasters
|
Date |
Event |
Impact |
|
1623-06 |
Tropical Cyclone |
Wrecked a squadron of warships near Cape San Blas with 9 ships sunk and 1039 dead. |
|
1757-10 |
Volcanic Eruption |
Euptions of Mount Moriah, Mount Lorenza, and the Samadzi volcano created fera of hostile attack as well as extensive nuee ardentes. |
|
1890-3 |
Epidemic |
The Coastal Sweating Sickness outbreak resulted in approximately 2000 deaths in coastal communities. |
|
1911-11-11 |
Severe Winter Storm |
The Lake Stanley Hurricane sank 10 ships, killed 243 mariners, and damaged ports on the Lake. |
|
1921-01-12 |
Avalanche |
The Hardscrabble Avalanche destroyed 30 buildings and killed 22 residents in the settlement. |
Source: Republic of Perilo 1948-2008
(4) Subsequent to the achievement of independence in 1948, Perilo has suffered a number of major events that required the widespread mobilization of national resources for their control and that attracted international attention. Table 3 below summarizes these nationally significant events and provides the mean annual incidence of events of each type of all categories of intensity.
Table 3. Significant Disaster Events Subsequent to Independence
|
Event Type |
Mean Annual Incidence at All Intensity Levels |
Significant Events |
|
Earthquake |
8 earthquakes of magnitude 2.0 or greater |
1948 Independence Day Earthquake |
|
Volcanic Eruption |
1 volcano in the Valley of Smoke |
1952 Mount Moriah Eruption 2003 Mount Moriah Eruption |
|
Wildland Fire |
6 burning 2000 acres or more |
1982 The Great Fire |
|
Sand/Dust Storm |
3 in the Great Waste |
1980 Black Blizzard |
|
Drought |
1 localized of less than 6 months duration |
1979-1982 Drought |
|
Severe Winter Storm |
2 in the Northern Massif |
|
|
Flooding |
1 riverine and 2 flash floods |
1965 Big Muddy Flood 1986 Desperation Flash Flood |
|
Coastal Storms |
3 tropical storms, 1 tropical cyclone, and 3 easters |
1997 April 1st Storm 1998 Tropical Cyclone Jana 2005 Tropical Cyclone Alesa 2006 Tropical Cyclone Irina 2007 Tropical Cyclone Alfonso |
|
Tornado |
8 tornadoes, 1 F3 or greater |
2005 Company Shops Tornado 2006 Industry Tornado |
|
Environmental |
15 spills or other hazardous waste accidents |
2000 Corona Explorer Grounding |
|
Epidemic |
2 significant disease outbreaks not reaching epidemic status |
1951 Polio 1953 Cholera 1957 Influenza 1964 Cholera 1971 Measles 1990-2008 Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome 1998 Marburg |
Source: Republic of Perilo 1948-2008
(5) The incidence of events that require a national disaster declaration has steadily increased in each decade since disaster records were first maintained in a systematic way (see Table 4 below). The significant jump in disaster events that caused the mobilization of national resources post-independence may reflect differences in perceptions of the definition of a disaster from those of the colonial administration, a common issue in the colonial world (see, for example, Davis 2001). The continued steady increase in events meriting national response most probably reflects improved disaster detection and notification capabilities that make national response to local events possible, increased population density, increased development, and increased expectations of the national government. The increased number of events by decade appears to be consistent with these factors. However, the increased frequency and severity of some types of natural events (including flooding, tornadoes, and tropical cyclones) is troubling.
Table 4. Incidence of Disaster Events Requiring National Response by Decade
|
Decade |
Number of Events Declared as Disasters |
Major Significant Events |
|
1920-1929 |
0 |
2 |
|
1930-1939 |
0 |
3 |
|
1940-1949 |
3 |
2 |
|
1950-1959 |
12 |
4 |
|
1960-1969 |
18 |
2 |
|
1970-1979 |
17 |
2 |
|
1980-1989 |
35 |
3 |
|
1990-1999 |
47 |
4 |
|
2000-2008 |
56 |
8 |
Source: Republic of Perilo 1948-2008
FORECAST METHOD
(6) This disaster forecast was developed based on the extrapolation of historical events as they can reasonably be expected to be shaped by global, regional, and national environmental, cultural, and technological forces over the next 20 years. A 20 year planning horizon was selected as a target date by which significant disaster response system improvements could be completed, assuming a coordinated effort by all government ministries and accepting limitations imposed by the need to continue existing programs in an environment of limited government revenue.
DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
(7) As a basis for the forecast, surveys were mailed to 127 atmospheric, earth, ocean, and disaster scientists at the Republic’s universities and 55 senior scientists on the staffs of national government agencies. These questionnaires requested that respondents list the five most important assumptions that they individually held about the development of hazards during the next 20 years. The response rate was 48% (n=87). Among the hazards identified, those cited at least 10 times were selected as the basis for scenario development (see Table 5). This cut score was selected for convenience in generating a reasonable number of assumptions; however, this means that inclusion of an assumption is based on its being shared by 11.5% of the respondents.
(8) Using qualitative content analysis these assumptions were examined for the key factors of increased frequency, magnitude or intensity, and impact for the subject of the assumption. In every case, one or more of these key factors was present. This suggests that a meta-assumption that this 20 year period will result in across the board increases in the threat posed by specific classes of natural disasters and by the totality of natural disaster events in the Republic.
Table 5. Forecast Assumptions
|
1. Global climate change will continue with a mean warming of 2 degrees centigrade over the period of the forecast. 2. The world demand for petroleum products will continue and actually increase. At the same time existing oil fields will begin to run dry, and world oil production will start to decrease. Efforts to control oil usage and find alternative fuels will continue to encounter significant resistance from major multinational oil companies, eventually proving to be largely ineffectual. 3. Access to water in general will decline around the globe, creating competition for water resources, both internationally and within countries, as both global population and industrial development increase. 4. Rising sea levels will expose low lying coastal areas and offshore islands to more severe impacts from ocean storms, including easters and tropical cyclones. 5. Severe weather, including severe winter weather, will increase in frequency and intensity over the forecast period. The tropical cyclone cycle is currently in its 30 year period of increased activity. Tropical cyclones of an increased intensity to Category 6 can be expected. 6. Increased temperatures and reduced water supplies increase the potential for drought, dust and sand storms, and large wildland fires. 7. Increasingly fragile ecosystems will be more vulnerable to and recover more slowly from environmental disasters. 8. Increased volcanic and earthquake activity should be expected, especially in the Smoke Valley caldera region. 9. There is a possibility that reversal of the magnetic poles may begin by the forecast year, causing significant magnetic disturbances. 10. Solar activity can be expected to increase with an increase in severe space weather during this period. 11. Current rates of species endangerment and extinction can be expected to accelerate, leading to reduced biodiversity, both nationally and internationally. |
TRIANGULATION OF ASSUMPTIONS
(9) Each assumption developed by the expert respondents was triangulated against the technical and futures literature and against the disaster record to ensure its credibility. Although many of these assumptions are open to question, there is sufficient support for each to justify their use for scenario construction. Digests of the support for triangulation of each assumption follow.
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 1. (10) Regardless of whether or not human activity is responsible for changes in the global climate (Singer and Avery 2007, evidence suggests that climate change is occurring and that such change will have significant impacts (Intergovernmental Panel 2007, Lynas 2008. A range of forecast degrees of change is generally projected to have variable effects, with larger increases in mean temperatures generating significantly, and even catastrophically, greater impacts in terms of storm intensities, increased sea levels, drought, and other environmental impacts (Gore 2006; Jennings 2008).
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 2. (11) Although there is considerable variability in forecasting when global oil supplies will be exhausted (Deming 2003; Baird 2008), a case can be made that production has peaked, or will shortly, and is on the decrease (Deffeyes 2005; United States Government 2007). If Gore’s formula (2006), old habits + new technology = dramatically altered consequences, is correct, the adoption of new technologies to stretch available supplies may have the perverse effect of generating even more dangerous consequences. This is particularly so if energy vendors and the general public choose short term gain or short term interests, over long term impacts (Jennings 2008).
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 3. (12) By 2008 rapid increases in demand for water for agricultural, industrial, and residential use are already emptying rivers and exceeding the recharge capability of some aquifers, resulting in falling water tables and the exhaustion of fossil aquifers. This is not a new concern, having been identified as early as 1986 (Reisner 1993). The growing shortfall of capacity versus use has clear implications for the environment (see, for example, the shrinking of even large bodies of water such as the Aral Sea and Lake Chad) (Gore 2006), food and energy production, political stability, and peace (Klare 2001; Pearce 2006; Brown 2008).
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 4. (13) Already island nations of the Pacific Ocean are experiencing widespread flooding under certain storm or high tide conditions (Lynas 2004). In the Indian Ocean such low lying island groups as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and the Republic of the Maldives (Knauer 2006) proved to be highly vulnerable to the tsunami of 2005-12-26. In addition, the experiences of Louisiana in the United States have shown the dangers associated with the destruction of offshore islands and marshes through development (Hallowell 2001; van Heerden and Bryan 2006; Brinkley 2006). Although there is debate over the degree of sea level rise that can be expected in the next 20 years, even small increases have the potential to magnify the impacts of other natural events. And raises in the meter or more range may be a possible outlier (Lynas 2008).
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 5. (14) Increased warming can be expected to generate increasing numbers of tropical cyclones of increased intensity (Mooney 2007). Although Simpson stated in 1999 that changes in the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale to differentiate intensities over Category 5 were unnecessary (Iacovelli 1999), recent storms have rekindled suggestions that a Category 6 may be appropriate (Category 6 Hurricanes? 2005; Than 2005; Blakemore 2006). The combination of increased frequency, increased intensity, and an increase in the upper intensity limit of storms poses a significantly elevated threat to coastal communities.
(15) At the same time the potential exists for climate change to either generate extreme winters or to reverse into a new ice age (Bell and Strieber 2000; Moran 2003). Winter storms may be more severe and more prolonged with a wider geographical coverage than those previously experienced.
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 6. (16) Climate change can be expected to result in increased temperatures over the period of the forecast; the speed of that change is open to question (Lynas 2008). However, the impacts from rising temperatures include those that may shift the environment in ways that could increase the loss of agricultural land and induce drought (Moran 2003, Kunstler 2005) leading to increased desertification, greater vulnerability to wildland fires, and increased deaths in heat waves.
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 7. (17) As disaster events increase in intensity and scope the potential for them to severely damage sensitive ecosystems increases as well. Raup (1991) noted that extinction becomes possible when all habitats are affected by an event that severely diminishes the numbers of any species. These effects include both plant and animal species (Lynas 2008). Simple population pressure from population growth and expansion into previously unsettled areas may be considered a disaster event in this context.
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 8. (18) Major calderas reflect subsidence of volcanoes following past catastrophic eruption events (Smith and Siegel 2000). The Smoke Valley Caldera is a very large caldera, approximately 80 miles in length and 35 miles in width (Fitzgerald 2003). Increased seismic activity and slow upward swelling in the Caldera (Armistead 2008) has not reached a point at which a new eruption from this volcano appears imminent. However, continued activity with an increasing intensity will be a serious cause for concern.
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 9. (19) Although believers that the year 2012 will see an Armageddon include in that belief that the magnetic poles will reverse with catastrophic impacts (Geryl 2006), such reversals are a geologically normal event. Similar beliefs that the Earth’s magnetic field is developing a mysterious crack (Joseph 2008) appear to be unfounded. Governmental sources state that it appears unlikely that the process will be either rapid or imminently catastrophic during the forecast period (Canada 2008).
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 10. (20) The year 2008 will be on the rising side of Solar Cycle 25, with increasing numbers of sunspots, assuming that Cycle 24 reaches minimum as predicted in 2020 (Biesecker 2007). Sunspot activity and solar flares are major causes of severe space weather, with electromagnetic storms having demonstrated the ability to generate orbital excursions and damage satellites in space and, in 1989, to disrupt and damage power transmission systems on the ground (Odenwald 2008).
ASSUMPTION NUMBER 11. (21) Current rates of species extinction rival those of previous major epochal extinction events and exceed the speed of such extinction processes. During this period rapid human population expansion will start to press the limits of the carrying capacity of the planet (Eldredge 2005). At the same time habitat extinction and human land use is increasing with significant environmental degradation (Novacek and Cleland 2001). In addition, the high levels of industrial pollution associated with some developing nations poses a potential threat in the case of increasing levels of industrialization in Perilo (Feshbach and Friendly 1992).
DEVELOPMENT OF SCENARIOS
(22) One scenario was developed for each of the 11 types of events that have previously resulted in disasters of national significance in the Republic. Scenarios were based on the significant events, extrapolated by an order of magnitude in intensity to account for the impact of the individual assumptions and the meta-assumption on the potential outcome. Each scenario was designed to incorporate at least two of the planning assumptions.
Table 6. Scenario Construction
|
Scenario |
Baseline Significant Event |
Assumptions |
|
Earthquake |
Independence Day Earthquake |
2, 8, 10 |
|
Volcanic Eruption |
1952 Mount Moriah |
7, 8 |
|
Wildland Fire |
The Great Fire |
1, 6, 11 |
|
Sand/Dust Storm |
Black Blizzard of 1980 |
1, 3, 6, 11 |
|
Drought |
Drought of 1979-1982 |
1, 3, 6, 7 |
|
Severe Winter Storm |
Hardscrabble Avalanche |
2, 5, 9, 10 |
|
Flooding |
Big Muddy Flood |
1, 5, 7 |
|
Coastal Storm |
Tropical Cyclone Alfonso |
1, 4, 5, 7 |
|
Tornado |
Company Shops Tornado |
1, 5 |
|
Environmental |
Corona Explorer Grounding |
2, 5, 7, 11 |
| Epidemic | Marburg | 7, 11 |
(23) Each scenario was developed in sufficient detail to allow its use as the basis for consideration in a table-top exercise, with details chosen to provide a range of impacts, consistent with the planning assumptions, and limiting factors for the response. This continues existing Ministry practice of using scenarios for the development of new plans. Current Perilan resources were used as the baseline for response. This resource baseline is based on the assumption that future resources will be maintained at essentially the same level as today, absent significant program activity to upgrade capabilities.
(24) Based on the problems posed by the scenarios a list of capabilities were developed to identify key changes that could be made in resources that might limit death and injury and property and environmental destruction. Identification of these factors was based on reviews of responses globally to major disaster events (Green 2008). The capabilities are included in the Required Capabilities section following the Forecast 2008. These were included to provide changes that could be easily injected in forecast table top exercises to allow assessment of various programmatic options for future year budgets.
FORCECAST 2028
EARTHQUAKE SCENARIO
(25) On 12 March a moment magnitude 8.1 earthquake occurred at 0451 Perilo Standard Time on the Xochimilco Fault with its epicenter 1.2 miles west southwest of Drusilla’s Junction. Modified Mercalli Intensity reports included XII in the immediate vicinity, XI in Glencoe, X in Jacksonville, and VIII in Hogben, Plank Road Junction, and Zanzibar. Fires were widespread in Glencoe. The Transnational Highway was blocked by buckled roadway and bridges across the Blue River and its tributaries collapsed. Military and civilian airfields, hospitals, and command centers, and communications systems in the National Capital Region suffered catastrophic damage, and the concentration of resources in the region meant that many response functions were severely degraded. The loss of military command and control functions also posed a threat to national defense capabilities. Approximately 80% of the buildings in the National Capital Region suffered extensive damage. The preliminary fatality count was 37,600 with an additional 132,000 injured.
(26) The response by the Republic’s emergency and military services, considering the level of disruption caused to their systems, was excellent. With hours outlying Battalions of Saint Randulf the Bishop Ambulance Corps and the Provincial Task Forces of the Auxiliary Fire Service had mobilized and were moving toward the epicenter. Aircraft from the Air Force’s 3rd Transportation, 4th Air Rescue, and 5th Liaison Squadrons, the Navy’s Sea Control Squadron 10, the Coast Guard’s Rescue Helicopter Squadron 9, and the Army’s 10 Aviation Company flew over 300 sorties on the first day of operations alone, providing rescue and damage assessment. The Constabulary and the Regular Army and the Territorial Army mobilized all available units for rescue work. The Province of the Southwest activated its emergency operations center, with the concurrence of the other provinces, as an alternate facility to manage the national response. The Amateur Radio Disaster Corps activated its stations and handled over 1200 messages in the first 24 hours for government agencies. However, communications were severely disrupted by on-going solar storms. The National Railway mobilized a rescue train out of its Northern Division and transported those injured who could be brought out of the region north to Astoria for medical care. However, the range of destruction, the quantity of debris, and severe damage to transportation arteries meant that access to the worst areas of destruction took over 2 weeks. In addition, damage to the Georgetown to Glencoe Pipeline meant that fuel supplies north of Company Shops were very limited. Finally the numbers of injured and the difficulty of reaching them severely compromised medical care and led to deaths that might not otherwise have occurred.
VOLCANIC ERUPTION SCENARIO
(27) On 29 July an eruption in the Smoke Valley Caldera created a new, and rapidly growing cinder cone, named by local residents the New Mountain. By 18 August New Mountain had reached 700 feet in height, and eruptive activity ended. However, this event did not reduce the increasing bulge in the Caldera, and during it the frequency of small earthquakes increased. By 1 October seismic activity was virtually continuous and changes in the bulge of as much as 0.5 meters a day were readily measurable; as a result the Geological Survey issued warning notices that further eruptive activity was possible. Unfortunately, the wording of the notice did not clearly convey to non-scientists the urgency of the situation. In addition, land developers and other economic interests in the Valley strongly criticized the warning as alarmist, unnecessary, and damaging to the economy. Most residents simply ignored it.
(28) On 13 October a massive volcanic explosion occurred in the caldera, approximately 170 miles southeast of Astoria, between the Hellmouth Volcano and Mount Moloch, venting approximately 80 cubic kilometers of ash into the atmosphere, and causing nuee ardentes that ran across the valley and up the sides of both the Northern Massif and the Sangre de Cristo Mountains. The town of Cripple Creek suffered some nuee ardent damage, and smaller towns of Blond, Banks, and Hardscrabble in the Valley were obliterated. Estimated fatalities number 22,000. Heavy ash fell in the area from Fort Wellesley to Astoria to Glencoe to Port Stanley and eastward, with depositions of feet in Astoria. Ash accumulation caused the collapse of at least 1,674 structures. Travel on the Transnational Highway and on rail lines from the Northern Massif north has been suspended and is not expected to reopen until the first quarter of 2029. The resulting impact on the Republic’s economy is very significant, in terms of mineral extraction, general commerce, transportation, and agriculture.
(29) Initial response to the disaster was impeded by the necessity to move large quantities of ash from roads and buildings, a task far beyond the capacity of existing highway and public works vehicles and crews. The increased operational tempo had a significant budget impact due to the high cost of fuel, and fears on the world market that the eruption might reduce the flow of oil from Perilo. Airborne ash delayed the Geographical Survey in attempting airborne survey of the disaster area, and prevented military helicopter operations to rescue survivors. The Perilan Air Force was able to deploy a tactical radar set to a location 100 miles southwest of Fort Wellesley to maintain air defense radar coverage of the Northern Province.
WILDLAND FIRE SCENARIO
(30) The drought of 2025-2028, combined with a widespread infestation of Geller’s Bark Beetle (an exotic wood-boring beetle) and substantial tree damage during the January 2028 Superstorm, created ideal conditions for the development of major wildland fires in the Piedmont region. On 19 July lightning strikes from a line of thunderstorms over a period of 7 hours ignited 32 wildland fires: 1 near Enterprise, 1 near Catalina, 1 near Nollsville, 2 northwest of Alamance, 1 five miles east of Plank Road Junction, and the remainder in the Great Forest. Because the strikes in the Great Forest happened after dark, detection of those fires was delayed by as much as 12 hours, allowing several fires to coalesce into major wildland fires north of Trail 3, between Trails 3 and 5 approximately 5 miles north of Fireside, and south of Trail 5. By the morning of 20 July the Republic faced a major fire crisis.
(31) On 20 July temperatures rose into the high 90 degrees Fahrenheit range across the impact region, and moderate winds in the afternoon facilitated fire spread. The fires near Enterprise and Catalina remained small and were controlled by the end of the day; however, those near Nollsville, Plank Road Junction, and Alamance were not finally controlled until 22 July. The fires in the Great Forest burned for an additional two months before the last one was extinguished. Approximately 4,000,000 acres (1,618,743 hectares) of timber burned, with a major economic impact on the Republic’s carbon footprint, forest industries, and the aboriginal inhabitants of the Great Forest. In addition, air quality in the Province of the East was significantly degraded.
SAND STORM SCENARIO
(32) The drought of 2025-2028 resulted in a slow expansion of the northern desert, with the small agricultural corridor along the Transnational Highway south of Astoria and on the north slope of the Northern Massif almost disappearing. Even the Valley of Smoke suffered a 20 percent reduction in land under cultivation as the desert increasingly encroached on the west end of the Valley.
(33) On 28 May the first of three strong pressure gradients transited south across the Great Waste. Subsequent events occurred on 1 June and 5 June. In each case high winds generated dense sand clouds, moving an estimated 30-35,000 tons of sand on each occasion. During the 28 May event, the rapid onset of high winds caused a tractor trailer transfer truck to tip over on the Transnational Highway, with 60 additional vehicles being involved in the accident as visibility deteriorated to zero feet. The severe conditions meant that word of the accident did not reach rescue services for 5 hours, and that rescuers were unable to reach the scene for another 3 hours. On all three days the Transnational Highway north of Astoria was blocked in multiple locations by drifting sand and Highways 10 to Fort Duffy and 12 to Carson Wells were impassable. Those farms not protected by the Sange de Cristo range simply disappeared under the accumulated sand deposits, with a loss of 5 percent of the Republic’s summer grain production. Approximately 200 structures collapsed under the load of sand and dust. An estimated 150 persons and 10,000 animals died in the wave of sand storms.
DROUGHT SCENARIO
(34) Starting in 2025 rainfall over the Piedmont, Northern Massif and the Great Waste fell well below normal annual totals. In the Piedmont, the shortfall was an average of 22.1 inches per year; in the Great Waste less than 0.1 inches of rain fell each year. This resulted in a loss of approximately 35 percent in annual crop yields in the Piedmont, even with intensive irrigation. Attempts to draw water from ground sources exceeded the recharge capability of the Sand Lake and Stanley aquifers, resulting in gradually decreasing flows. Lake Stanley fell by 3 feet by June 2028, severely restricting access by lake shipping to some communities on the east side of the Lake. Prolonged high temperatures, with two extended heat waves in 2026, three in 2027, and one in June 2028 resulted in elevated death tolls among the elderly, very young, and poor in Piedmont urban centers, with an average of 1000 deaths in each event. A number of vulnerable plant species, including the Zanzibar Lilly and Hewett’s Briar, suffered loss of as much as 70% of their populations. This in turn appears to have had a devastating effect on the Perilan Honeybee population, with commercial hives suffering loss of approximately 85 percent of the colonies and observations indicating that wild bee populations have similarly fallen. The impact on the ability of the agricultural system to recover has not been determined, but may be very significant.
SEVERE WINTER STORM SCENARIO
(35) In January 2028 a cold superstorm developed over the Great Waste and slowly swept south, blanketing the entire Republic with cold air, high winds, and heavy snow for 8 days. Snowfalls in the Northern Massif from this storm reached 10 to 12 feet in depth, over the Piedmont 7 to 11 feet, and on the Coastal Plain 4 to 6 feet. Low temperatures everywhere in the Republic were below freezing for days, with very low temperatures (below 0 degrees Fahrenheit) in the Northern Massif and Great Waste. Winds reached 70 knots at their peak with some gusts in exposed locations reaching 100 knots. All transportation was halted by the depth of snow and by drifts. At one time on January 24th, electric power outages blanketed 96 percent of the Republic’s landmass. Power failures were exacerbated by an ongoing solar storm and by unexplained electrical disruptions.
(36) Fatalities among unprepared populations in urban areas are estimated at 29,000 with deaths from hypothermia being the primary cause. Even those who were well equipped with well constructed residences with good insulation and adequate clothing suffered due to scarcities in heating oil and the prevalence of heating systems powered by electricity. Agricultural animal fatalities are estimated at 135,000 animals. High winds and high seas resulted in the loss of 4 lake freighters, 2 ocean going freighters, and one very large crude carrier, driven ashore while waiting off Petroport to dock at the oil terminal to pick up cargo. A Perilo Air Shorts 330 Skyvan attempting to land at Astoria slid off the runway on 19 January, with only minor injuries to the passengers and crew. A Perilo Air Force 4th Air Rescue Squadron helicopter on a search for stranded motorists on the Transnational Highway near Divide disappeared on 21 January and has not been located. The Glencoe to the North Express train with 150 persons aboard was stranded 42 miles south of Astoria for 4 days, until a National Railway Northern Division rescue train from Astoria was able to punch through the drifts to reach it.
FLOODING SCENARIO
(37) The unusually severe winter of 2027 deposited an exceptionally thick snowpack on the mountains of the Northern Massif. Runoff from melting combined with a month long period of heavy rain resulted in the Big Muddy, Blue, Watkins and Ney Rivers rising above flood stage for the first time since 1965 during the third week of March. The Big Muddy River caused significant flooding across the low lands of Nova Caledonia to the west and in its Delta in Perilo. The Trans-National Highway bridge at Hogben was closed due to damage to its approaches, the Western Defense Highway bridge at Pickett’s Ferry was badly damaged, and travel by the Coastal Highway was blocked by flooding of the ferry slips at Fort Matanzas, Castle Rae, and Chambersburg. The pier and quay facilities at both Georgetown and Petroport were flooded. The Blue River flooded Clarks’ Ferry and low lying parts of Glencoe, and the Eastern Highway was cut by flooding on the Watkins River.
(38) Repair of the port and highway damage is estimated to require a year. Over 45,000 persons were evacuated from various flood impact areas, creating a major logistical challenge for their sheltering and feeding. Efforts of the Perilo Red Diamond, the Salvation Army, the Order of Saint Randulf the Bishop, and the Army were barely able to provide regular meals, potable water, sanitary facilities, and tent shelters to meet the need.
(39) The large amount of silt carried down the river systems by the flooding had significant impacts on fish and shellfish in the Big Muddy, and contamination may result in river fisheries being closed for up to six months. There is concern that two endangered river species, the Hogben Oyster in the Great Muddy and the Perilan Crayfish in the Blue, may have suffered both loss of habitat and destruction of sufficient breeding stock that extinction may result. Recovery of both species after generations of overharvesting was an important objective of the fisheries industry, as both were highly prized by gastronomes.
COASTAL STORM SCENARIO
(40) Tropical Cyclone Tanya rapidly increased in intensity as it transited east by north along the coastal shelf of Nova Caledonia, reaching Category 6 intensity when 90 miles south of the mouth of the Big Muddy on the night of 15 August. Lands End and Norfolk Island were overwashed by the storm as it continued, turning to the northeast on 16 August, and making landfall at Ashby in the early morning hours of 17 August. Tropical Cyclone Tanya tracked northeast over land gradually decreasing in intensity. Category 3 wind strengths battered Portsmouth, and the storm maintained Category 1 strength as it passed over the southern end of Lake Stanley, causing widespread destruction of forest resources in the Great Forest.
(41) The coast line and all of the offshore and barrier islands along the coast suffered extreme erosion damage, with the beach structure in front of the marshes of the Great Muddy Delta being largely obliterated, and much of the inland marsh contaminated by saltwater. All of the coastal communities east of Petroport and west of Cape San Blas, including the city of Ashby, were inundated by storm surge coming at highest high tide. Over 80% of the structures within 10 miles of the coast were destroyed in the area from 50 miles east of Petroport to 50 miles east of Ashby, with damage being done by the storm surge and winds in excess of 200 miles per hour. Approximately 30 vessels were sunk by the storm, including two lake freighters on Lake Stanley, and another 40 driven aground or ashore. The rapidly intensifying storm caught many coastal residents as they attempted to evacuate, leading to an unusually high loss of life on the roads as automobiles were overturned by winds or blown off exposed roads. Heavy rains (in excess of 18 inches within 24 hours) caused widespread flooding, with deaths being associated with the rapidly rising water. In addition, at least three storm shelters are known to have failed under high winds and flooding. The total fatality count is unknown but believed to exceed 11,000.
TORNADO SCENARIO
(42) On 1 April an unusually large supercell thunderstorm embedded in a line of thunderstorms sweeping east across the Piedmont spawned an intense Fjutia 5 tornado that tracked on the ground for 176 miles. For most of its track the tornado passed through wooded and agricultural land, with only scattered fatalities and injuries. However, at 1710 it churned through the town of Plank Road Junction. Warning was minimal as reports of the tornado’s passage had only begun to arrive at the National Forecast Office and the storm itself never came within detection range of military or weather radars. The damage included 40% of the buildings in Plank Road Junction destroyed or severely damaged, closure of both the National Railway tracks and the Defense Highway. No community shelters capable of protection against tornado winds were available to residents. The initial casualty count is 342 dead and 6,317 injured.
ENVIRONMENTAL SCENARIO
(43) As concerns increase about the exhaustion of global oil supplies, pressure has been placed on the King 1 oil field to produce and export increased volumes of oil. To transport oil at the least cost while preserving as much of the supply as possible for sale, oil companies have returned to the practice of building and using ultra large crude carriers with cargo capacities in excess of 320,000 tons, including V Plus size vessels (Tankers International 2005). One such vessel is the 1700 foot long MV Petro Merchant, a 638,749 deadweight ton tanker with a cargo capacity of 4,796,500 barrels of oil (for examples, see The Nock Nevis 2008, Ultra Large Crude 2008).
(44) The fully laden ultra large crude carrier MV Petro Merchant departed Petroport on 28 June 2028 as the outer rain bands of the Category 1 Tropical Cyclone Ekaterina (the 5th storm of the season) reached the mouth of the Big Muddy River. As she proceeded to sea, the Petro Merchant suffered an engine room fire and steering casualty southwest of Norfolk Island. She dropped anchor and requested assistance of salvage vessels from Petroport. The Coast Guard Cutter Sumner Kimball, sortieing to sea for survival, diverted to the scene and took off all but the minimum essential crew. With the arrival of hurricane force winds, the Petro Merchant dragged, ran aground on the Ushant Banks between Lands End and Norfolk Island, and broke up as Tropical Cyclone Ekaterina intensified to a Category 2 storm. Attempts to rescue the 15 mariners who remained aboard were futile, as the aging rescue helicopters from the 4th Air Rescue Squadron were unable to penetrate the storm and lacked the range to reach the incident site from airfields outside the tropical storm force windfield. The entire crude oil cargo spilled, creating a slick that extends east to Overwash Island. The ensuing ecological disaster has the potential to further damage the fragile wetlands of the Big Muddy delta, kill very large numbers of fish and sea birds and mammals, and destroy the remnants of Perilo’s fishing industry.
EPIDEMIC SCENARIO
(45) In April 2028 an outbreak of a previously unknown haemorrhagic fever in the vicinity of the town of Lakeside, quickly spread north and south along the shores of Lake Stanley. Retrospective epidemiological studies suggest that the disease may have been present in the Great Forest for at least five years, but it was not detected by the existing surveillance system. Smaller settlements along the forest trails were decimated, in some cases with no survivors, as residents of the Great Forest fled to the communities along the shoreline of Lake Stanley. By the end of May 2028 approximately 5,000 had died from the fever and another 7,000 were reported ill. By the end of June 2028, the towns and cities of Lakeside, Travora, Port Stanley, and Alamance had lost 33% of their populations to the disease, some 32,000 dead. Named Lake Stanley Haemorrhagic Fever, the disease appears to use insects, specifically biting flies and mosquitoes, as the primary vectors of transmission. It has resisted all known therapies for haemorrhagic fevers, although survival rates were as much as 50% higher for patients treated in modern medical facilities.
(46) In addition to the death toll, the epidemic had major societal and economic consequences. Some communities erected barricades to prevent outsiders from entering (a traditional practice among the indigenous population in times of disease), and in other communities persons recently arrived in the community (within the last 10 years) have been isolated and even attacked by their neighbors. Road travel in the affected areas has largely been halted, by barriers, by fear, and by the lack of basic services needed by travelers.
THE TIPPING POINT
(47) At some point, combinations of events, in many cases small and insignificant by themselves, have the potential to cause a rapid and massive change in the larger course of events. This combination has been called a tipping point (Gladwell 2002). The likely confluence of two or more major disaster events of an order of magnitude greater than those previously seen in Perilo provides a potential prodrome (Fink 1986) that a tipping point is being reached. This should be regarded as a particular grave situation, as such a disaster tipping point may have the potential to severely, negatively impact the future of the Republic.
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES TO MEET THE FORECAST
(48) This forecast provides a series of possible events that would prove difficult to manage at any effective level with the current resources of the Republic. To meet what appears to be the potential range of threats over the next 20 years, significant improvements in the Republic’s ability to mitigate in advance and be prepared to manage major events are required. The forecast scenarios offer only a snapshot of possibilities based on past experience projected forward to reflect future trends. As such they are not exhaustive, and the potential for a Black Swan event (an unexpected outlier beyond current experience) means that they may not even be indicative of the possible threats of 2028 (Taleb 2007). However, development of the capabilities in Table 7 would increase the capabilities of the Ministry to preserve lives, property, and the environment in the future.
Table 7. Required Capabilities to Meet Forecast Conditions
|
Scenario |
Required Capabilities |
|
Earthquake |
(1) Dispersal of primary and alternate command centers and communications nodes and the hardening of communications systems. (2) Improved ability to rapidly clear roads, erect temporary bridges, and restore rail lines and airfields. (3) Expandable capacity for large numbers of injured. (4) Improved heavy rescue capabilities. (5) Enhanced capability to move fuel to impact areas. |